Abstract
AI software development agents are increasingly capable of modifying infrastructure and security critical systems, creating risks where an agent completes its assigned task while covertly weakening safeguards through actions such as broadening permissions, degrading logging, or introducing persistence mechanisms.
While frontier laboratories may deploy sophisticated monitoring pipelines, many organizations and individual users adopting coding agents lack the resources and governance maturity required to maintain complex learned monitor ensembles.
We study this problem as infrastructure level sabotage under task success in the infrastructure-as-code setting and compare trained and untrained monitors across synchronous and asynchronous deployment modes.
We introduce an Information Flow Graph (IFG) monitor that analyzes structural security regressions using control-flow and data-flow graph diffs alongside raw code diffs.
In asynchronous evaluation, an untrained git diff monitor misses 11.6% attacks at 1% false positive rate auditing budget, our untrained IFG monitor reduces this to 3.5%, and the trained Async RF monitor achieves below 1%.
Unlike the trained Async RF monitor, IFG can also operate synchronously as a pre-deployment safeguard that blocks suspicious infrastructure changes before execution or merge. In synchronous mode, IFG realtime rollback reduces joint main task and covert task success from 74.4% to 0.0% with no measurable reduction in legitimate task completion.
These results suggest that untrained structural monitors provide a practical and auditable path toward democratizing deployment safety for organizations seeking trustworthy adoption of advanced AI agents.
Blogger's Review: The proposed IFG monitor effectively mitigates security risks by comparing control-flow and data-flow graphs, showcasing how to enhance AI agent deployment safety with limited resources. This provides essential safeguards for the widespread adoption of AI technologies and deserves further attention and research.