Violet teaming has been proposed as a way to embed technical, policy and societal considerations into the assessment of emerging technologies. This article documents a pilot expert workshop that explored violet teaming as a governance methodology for AI capabilities relevant to biodefense.\n\nThe workshop used a hypothetical technology scenario divided into three sequential stages: capability development, misuse potential, and implementation. Experts from technical, security, operational and policy backgrounds participated in each stage, allowing a unified examination of benefits, risks and real‑world challenges rather than treating them in isolation.\n\nDuring capability development, participants evaluated core performance metrics and positive use cases. In the misuse potential stage, the team uncovered non‑obvious abuse pathways, such as using model‑generated biological sequences to design synthetic bioweapons. The implementation stage focused on deployment workflows, regulatory compliance and policy constraints.\n\nKey observations included:\n- A staged, multidisciplinary review reveals risk couplings across phases;\n- Interventions must go beyond technical safeguards to include institutional measures like review boards and accountability frameworks;\n- Operational resources and policy environments critically shape the effectiveness of protective measures.\n\nThe lessons suggest that violet teaming is suitable for assessing complex dual‑use technologies, enabling early risk governance and providing cross‑disciplinary intervention points for decision makers.\n\nReview: The workshop highlights the importance of cross‑domain collaboration in AI governance and offers practical insights for building more systematic risk assessment frameworks.